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ABSTRACT 
If one is to believe the popular press and many “technical writings,” 
blockchains create not only a perfect transactional environment but also 
obviate the need for banks, lawyers and courts. The latter will soon be 
replaced by smart contracts: unbiased and infallible computer programs that 
form, perform and enforce agreements. Predictions of future revolutions 
must, however, be distinguished from the harsh reality of the commercial 
marketplace and the technical limitations of blockchain technologies. The 
fact that a technological solution is innovative and elegant need not imply 
that it is commercially useful or legally viable. Apart from attempting a 
terminological “clean-up” surrounding the term smart contract, this paper 
presents some technological and legal constraints on their use. It confronts 
the commonly made claims concerning their ability to automate the 
transacting process and to ensure perfect performance. It also examines the 
possibility of reducing contractual relationships into code and the ability to 
integrate smart contracts with the complexities of the real world. A closer 
analysis reveals that smart contracts can hardly be regarded as a semi-
mythical technology liberating the contracting parties from the shackles of 
traditional legal and financial institutions. While some of their technical 
features seem prima facie attractive, especially to non-lawyers, a closer 
analysis reveals their many shortcomings.   
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Purportedly, smart contracts are contracts that are represented in code and executed 
by computers. They are not only formed online but their very performance is enabled 
and guaranteed by a network of decentralized, co-operating computer nodes, known 
as blockchains. Originally, smart contracts were contemplated within a limited range 
of transactions, predominantly financial instruments. Progressively, however, the 
surrounding narrative has become broader, implying that all contracts can be made 
smart or that many different obligations can be enforced by code. What started as a 
niche phenomenon in such areas as financial derivatives and prediction markets, is 
now poised to change the entire legal landscape and “revolutionize” commerce. 
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Allegedly, smart contracts can streamline the contracting process, reduce transaction 
costs by eliminating intermediaries and, most importantly, simplify enforcement by 
obviating the need to seek protection from traditional legal institutions, such as 
courts. The theories underpinning smart-contracts and blockchains combine multiple, 
interrelated threads all of which reflect an indiscriminate, if not irrational, fascination 
with certain technical characteristics of blockchains.  They also reflect a surprising 
lack of trust in humans. As the latter are perceived as inherently biased and 
unreliable, things should be left to computers. Humans, especially bankers and 
judges, are fallible and not trustworthy.1 Computers, on the other hand, are objective, 
infallible and trustworthy.2 The very idea of smart contracts is thus inextricably tied 
to the elimination of human judgement, the reduction of dependence on financial 
intermediaries and, in many instances, a detachment from the legal system.3  In other, 
more commercially-oriented contexts, smart contracts can simply be seen as part of 
the broader trend to use technology to ensure a consistent application of legal rules 
and agreements. 
 
The legal analysis of smart contracts is rendered difficult by the fact that the 
phenomenon originated in technical writings, which are characterized by an 
inconsistent and incorrect use of legal terms. Given the complexity of the 
technologies underlying smart contracts (distributed networks and asymmetric 
cryptography, amongst others) it is also difficult to evaluate many claims concerning 
their actual capabilities and real potential to change (speak: revolutionize) the 
commercial and legal landscape. One is often left with a common-sense estimate of 
what is (or can be) technologically viable and what is legally permissible or 
necessary. To complicate matters, the smart contract narrative is often laden with 
ideologically charged arguments that associate certain technological features of 
blockchains (e.g. decentralized consensus) with broader social and economic issues, 
such as the disenchantment with financial institutions or the (perceived) lack of trust 
in the legal system.  Many claims made in technical writings are tainted by the 
assumption that certain technological features (decentralization, again…) are 
absolute values and must be preserved at any cost. In the same vein, it is often 
assumed that because a particular technology is innovative or revolutionary, it is also 
commercially useful or capable of solving actual legal problems. This, however, is 
often not the case.  Arguably, the entire idea of smart contracts may be the result of a 
series of terminological misunderstandings. At the same time, assuming that in some 
instances smart contracts are or represent contracts in the legal sense, their practical 
deployment may raise some interesting issues that transcend the simple question 
whether it is technically and legally possible to automate the contracting process.  
 
Roadmap 
 
This paper is structured as a high-level introduction to some basic issues concerning 
the legal and (to an extent) technical viability of smart contracts. The analysis aims to 
                                                      
* I wish to thank Ernie Teo and Pralhad Deshpande (from IBM research), Jens Krebs, John O’Brien, the coding teams at Attores 
and Otonomos, especially Gaurang Torvekar and Mano Thalanaban, Jason Teutsch (Truebit), as well as my SMU colleagues 
Kelvin Low and Simon Schillebeeckx; all mistakes are mine.   
1 For a humorous description see: Schumpeter, Not-so-clever contracts (2016) The Eonomist, at: 
www.economist.com/news/business/21702758-time-being-least-human-judgment-still-better-bet-cold-hearted 
2 See generally: Gavin Wood, Ethereum: A Secure Decentralised Generalised Transaction Ledger (2015), who proclaims the 
impartiality of autonomous enforcement by code, 1. 
3 Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Smart Contracts, Bitcoin Bots and Consumer Protection (2014) 71 Washington and Lee Law Review 
Online 35, 37-38. 
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remain broad and generic, with few references to specific industries or specific 
instantiations of smart contracts. Its contents and sequence are largely dictated by the 
popular claims made in technical writings. The discussion commences with an 
exploration of the very concept of smart contracts, their relationship with 
blockchains and the core terms surrounding their use, such as “trustlessness,” “self-
enforcement” and “validation.” Consequently, the first part of the paper can be 
regarded as a terminological “clean-up” followed by some technical explanations. 
This part also inquires whether smart contracts are or can be legally enforceable. The 
second part examines two problem areas, which can be reduced to the following 
questions:  
  
(a) What are the implications of the fact that smart contracts must be expressed 
in code?  
 
(b) Can the benefits of the blockchain be preserved if most smart contracts 
necessitate a connection with the real world?  
 
Finally, readers should be aware of the following caveats with regard to the scope 
and depth of the paper. First, bypassing the regulatory aspects of blockchains, this 
paper does not address the question whether bitcoins or any other crypto currencies 
(“tokens”) constitute legal tender. It assumes, however, that the use of such tokens is 
legal and both parties to the smart contract agree to accept such as part of the 
exchange. After all, each blockchain-based smart contract involves the transfer of 
crypto-tokens. Second, the term “technical writings” denotes various resources, such 
as white papers or blogs, many of which would not withstand a peer-review process 
but which are regarded as authoritative by the tech-community. Notably, there is no 
single source about smart contracts or blockchains comparable to Requests for 
Comments, which provide reliable descriptions of the core protocols and 
technologies of the Internet. Consequently, all researchers in this area face the 
challenges of finding reliable information and reconciling inconsistent terminology. 
Third, some technical simplifications are necessary. One could, for example, indulge 
in detailed explanations of the mining process, delve into comparisons between 
different blockchains or endlessly dissect the concept of “validation.” While some 
detail is unavoidable, this paper aims to convey broad ideas without going into 
technological minutiae. It is acknowledged that there are different blockchains, 
different smart contracts and different ways in which smart contracts relate to or 
interact with their underlying blockchains. Some descriptions may fit one 
configuration, but not another.4The difficulties of making generalized statements are 
particularly acute in light of the division into permissionless and permissioned 
blockchains. Fourth, the paper does not address the problems of confidentiality, 
privacy or identification. 
 
 
2. Terminology & Technicalities 
 
There are multiple definitions of smart contracts. Some of them are purely technical 
and associate smart contracts with pieces of autonomous code operating on a 
blockchain5 or with “systems which automatically move digital assets according to 
                                                      
 
5 Wood (n 2), 15. 
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arbitrary pre-specified rules.”6 Other definitions associate smart contracts with the 
formalized expression and automated execution of legal contracts, with the use of 
code to perform contractual agreements, 7  with protocols that “facilitate, verify, 
execute or embody the terms of a contract”8 or with the embedding of legal terms in 
hardware and software to prevent breach or to control assets by digital means. 9  
Another group of definitions commences with a technical description only to observe 
that the given protocol will have serious legal implications.10 In some instances the 
term “contract” is used informally, with no claims being made as to its legal 
significance; in others, technical writings take the “contract” terminology seriously 
and theorize that smart contracts in general will obviate the need for lawyers and 
judges by automating and guaranteeing contractual performance. Those making such 
claims, however, often use the term “contract” so liberally that it loses any 
resemblance to its original definition - that of a legally enforceable agreement. One 
must wonder: once a linguistic clean-up is completed and once it becomes apparent 
that many smart contracts are not contracts, will there be anything left worth 
discussing from a legal perspective? After all, if “smart contracts” are nothing but 
programs that run on a blockchain, there is no need for lengthy academic papers 
debating their legal implications. The unfortunate terminology is attributable to a  
paper by Szabo, which describes smart contracts as follows:  
 
Smart contracts combine protocols with user interfaces to formalize and 
secure relationships over computer networks. Objectives and principles 
for the design of these systems are derived from legal principles, 
economic theory, and theories of reliable and secure protocols. 11   
 
The paper elaborates that smart contracts “utilize protocols and user interfaces to 
facilitate all steps of the contracting process,” including negotiation, performance, 
and adjudication. 12  Some of the propositions made therein, such as the need to 
develop new digital institutions, reflect the popular fascination with the “digital 
revolution,” which characterizes all early cyberlaw scholarship. They exemplify 
naïve notions of law, including the perceived inadequacy of “old” (i.e. pre-Internet) 
systems, and the assumption that technological progress can remedy all problems – 
including those inherent in the operation of the legal system. Given that the 
“seminal” paper was written in the mid-90s, it does not surprise that it portrays courts 
and legal principles as inconvenient legacies to be made redundant by suitable 
technologies. Other propositions made therein, such as the use of technology to 
secure contractual performance or to ensure adherence to the law, have evolved into 
the theory that “code is law” and that technology has normative implications.13 Using 
technology to enforce the law or private agreement is thus not a novel idea. What is 
new in the smart contract narrative, however, is the combination of an indiscriminate 
                                                      
6 Vitalik Buterin Ethereum White Paper: A Next Generation Smart Contract & Decentralized Application Platform (2015).  
7 Josh Stark, How Close Are Smart Contracts to Impacting Real-World Law? (2016) www.coindesk.com/blockchain-smarts-
contracts-real-world-law 
8 T. Swanson. Great chain of numbers: A guide to smart contracts, smart property and trustless asset management, 2014. 
(“Swanson”) 11, 16 
9 Nick Szabo, Smart Contracts: Formalizing and Securing Relationships on Public Networks (1997) 2 (9) First Monday 2.  
10 see e.g. Fan Zhang, et al., Town Crier: An Authenticated Data Feed for Smart Contracts (2016) 1, who define smart contracts 
as programs that execute autonomously on the blockchain, only to imply that such programs execute the terms of a contract and 
enforce payments that are due under such contract.  
11 Szabo (n 9) 1. 
12 Szabo(n 9) 2. 
13 Lawrence Lessig, Code version 2.0 (Basic Books 1999); Roger Brownsword, Rights, Regulation, and the Technological 
Revolution (Oxford University Press, 2013); Frank Pasquale, ‘Technology, Competition and Values’ (2007) 8 Minn. J.L. Sci. & 
Tech. 607 
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trust in technology, especially blockchains, with an unparalleled misapprehension of 
basic legal concepts. The “seminal” paper itself abounds in legal terminology, 
creating an impression that its propositions are grounded on solid legal principles. 
Most concepts described therein are, however, misrepresented. What follows is a 
morass of technological and legal jargon, which is endlessly recycled in subsequent 
technical writings. The latter are oblivious to the differences between private and 
public law, between substance and evidence as well as between contract and property 
law. Given this terminological confusion, it has been suggested to differentiate 
between smart contracts, which are pure code or computer programs, and smart 
contracts in the legal sense. 14 While such distinction is prima facie attractive, it may 
be difficult to sustain as even smart contracts in the legal sense may contain smart 
contract code. Moreover, technical writings rarely acknowledge this division and 
abound in claims that even smart contracts which are computer programs may have 
far-reaching legal implications. 
 
Additional misunderstandings derive from the fact that nearly all technical writings 
regard vending machines as early examples of smart contracts. The resulting theory 
is that vending machines not only automate the transacting process but also 
instantiate contractual terms in their hardware. This in turn renders the terms 
immutable and guarantees that the contract is executed as coded. From a legal 
perspective, however, a vending machine is not a contract but an offer made to the 
world at large.15 The offer is made by the vendor, who uses the machine to display 
his goods to the public. A contract is formed with whoever selects one of the 
available options and inserts the required sum. Unquestionably, the vending machine 
can automate both the formation and the performance of a contract, usually a sale of 
goods. It ensures that transactions can occur in only one particular manner and, 
vandalism or malfunction aside, guarantees that the goods are dispensed only to 
those who provide payment. In this sense, it ensures perfect performance. The same 
could be said of many e-commerce websites, such as Amazon.com or Spotify, which 
automate contract formation and, whenever the contractual subject matter is digital 
(e.g. music, eBooks) also the performance of the contract. Embedding business logic 
in hardware or software does not, however, transform such hardware or software into 
a contract - just like the automated release of goods by vending machines does not 
constitute a reification of a contract of sale. Neither vending machines nor websites 
are or enforce contracts. They can only dispense goods (or provide access to online 
content) in response to payment. Moreover, vending machines are technically 
incapable of embodying (and hence automating) all terms of the transaction, such as 
exclusion clauses, warranties of fitness or suitability for purpose. All terms of the 
transaction can be displayed on the machine – but very few can be instantiated by the 
machine. In sum, the vending machine example taints most technical writings with 
the incorrect assumption that the automation of a transaction (or certain stages 
thereof) transforms the automaton into a smart contract or makes the transaction 
itself smart.  
 
3. Blockchains  
 
Although the idea of smart contracts predates blockchains, the latter have sparked a 
new interest in the area. Blockchains are commonly associated with crypto-
                                                      
14 See: J. Stark. Making sense of blockchain smart contracts (2016) www.coindesk.com/making-sense-smart-contracts 
15 Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking Ltd [1971] 2 QB 163 
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currencies, such as bitcoins, but it is necessary to distinguish between the two. 
Blockchains are increasingly, recognized as a generic technology that can be 
deployed for other purposes, such as a payment network, a platform for asset and 
supply chain management or a technology facilitating recordkeeping. 16 There are 
hundreds (if not thousands) of different blockchains that often significantly diverge 
from the original bitcoin blockchain and share very few of its characteristics.17 In 
many instances, it seems more correct to speak of distributed ledger technologies, or 
“DLTs, which denote a broader category of geographically replicated, synchronized 
and often decentralized data stores. 18  It is also necessary to distinguish between 
permissionless and permissioned blockchains as it is only the former that are 
decentralized, visible to all and devoid of any access restrictions.19 In principle, many 
arguments made in the context of permissionless blockchains (such as Bitcoin or 
Ethereum) lose their validity in the context of permissioned blockchains. In fact, the 
latter have developed specifically in response to the shortcomings of the former. 
Such developments have, however, resulted in the “loss” of some of the original 
characteristics of the blockchain, such as decentralization. Unless indicated 
otherwise, this paper refers to the original bitcoin blockchain.  It is the characteristics 
of the latter that have spurred revolutionary, if not anarchistic, theories about 
blockchains “changing the world of commerce” and “the fabric of society”. 20 
Moreover, the original bitcoin blockchain best illustrates the limitations of this 
technology. 21  And so, in laymen’s terms, the blockchain can be described as a 
decentralized, peer-validated crypto-ledger that provides a publicly visible, 
chronological and permanent record of all prior transactions. It resembles a 
spreadsheet that anybody can add a row to, but cannot otherwise update or delete 
anything.22 The original blockchain was devised for a single purpose: the prevention 
of double spending of cryptocurrencies in a system without a centralized entity 
controlling the issuance or transfer of such currencies.23  The problem of double 
spending was solved by making all transactions, both current and past, visible to 
everybody.24 The original bitcoin paper did not envisage smart contracts and did not 
use the blockchain for anything else than the generation and transfer of tokens. In 
contrast, the Ethereum blockchain that was specifically developed to enable smart 
contracts.25 The important point is that there are many different blockchains with 
many different characteristics.  
                                                      
16 Trevor I. Kiviat, Beyond Bitcoin: Issues In Regulating Blockchain Transactions (2015) 65 Duke L.J. 569, 575; Jeanne L. 
Schroeder, Bitcoin and the Uniform Commercial Code (2016) 24 U. Miami Bus. L. Rev. 1 at 65; Joshua A.T. Fairfield, 
Bitproperty, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 805 (2015). 
17 Melanie Swan, Blockchain: Blueprint for a New Economy (2015) O’Reilly Media, Sebastopol, 9. 
18 Distributed Ledger Technology: beyond block chain, UK Government, Office of Science (2016). 
19 See generally: Tim Swanson, Consensus-as-a-service: a brief report on the emergence of permissioned, distributed ledger 
systems (2015); for a comparison between the Bitcoin and Ethereum blockchains and a permissioned blockchain, see: Richard 
Gendal Brown, et al., Corda: An Introduction (2016) 13, 14. 
20 Don Tapscott, Alex Tapscott, Blockchain Revolution (2016, Penguin); William Mougayar, The Business Blockchain (2016, 
John Wiley, Hoboken); WEF 
21 Arguably, these very limitations gave raise to the creation of Ethereum and permissioned blockchains.  
22 Kiviat (n 16) 578. 
23 Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System (2008) 1. 
24 Nakamoto (n 23) 2. 
25 The Ethereum foundation website describes it as an open blockchain platform that lets anyone build and use decentralized 
applications that run on blockchain technology. Unlike the Bitcoin protocol, Ethereum was designed to be adaptable and flexible. 
a next-generation blockchain that had the ambitions to implement a general, fully trustless smart contract platform. Moreover: 
“The Ethereum platform itself is featureless or value-agnostic. Similar to programming languages, it is up to entrepreneurs and 
developers to decide what it should be used for. However, it is clear that certain application types benefit more than others from 
Ethereum’s capabilities. Specifically, ethereum is suited for applications that automate direct interaction between peers or 
facilitate coordinated group action across a network. For instance, applications for coordinating peer-to-peer marketplaces, or the 
automation of complex financial contracts. Bitcoin allows for individuals to exchange cash without involving any middlemen 
like financial institutions, banks, or governments. Ethereum’s impact may be more far-reaching. In theory, financial interactions 
or exchanges of any complexity could be carried out automatically and reliably using code running on Ethereum. Beyond 
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To understand the implications and limitations of blockchains in the context of smart 
contracts, it is necessary to indulge into some technical explanations. As the name 
implies, the blockchain is made of interconnected blocks. Each block contains a list 
of all prior transactions. The term “transaction” denotes the transfer of tokens (e.g. 
bitcoins) from one account to another. In most contexts, it has a narrow and technical 
meaning, limited to shifts of tokens between accounts. The creation of each block 
requires a significant amount of computation (“mining”). To create a block and 
append it to the blockchain, each mining node (i.e. participant in the network) must 
provide a “proof-of-work:” a piece of data which is computationally difficult to 
produce but easy for other nodes to verify.26 As these computations are extremely 
expensive in terms of electricity costs, it is more economical to produce new valid 
blocks (i.e. those that follow the rules) than to commit resources to corrupting the 
blockchain by changing old blocks. Given the cost and difficulty of retrospectively 
changing the existing blockchain, the possibility of a transaction being altered or 
reversed is infinitesimal. 27  Consequently, the blocks are mathematically chained 
together and guarantee that a transaction cannot be modified without modifying the 
block that records it and all following blocks.28 The blockchain can thus be regarded 
an incorruptible record of all prior transactions, as one source of truth visible to all. It 
must be further noted that (a) the mining process relies exclusively on the computing 
power of the individual nodes and not to any particular skill or knowledge on the side 
of the node’s operator, i.e. the miner; (b) smart contracts concern transactions, not 
the generation of new tokens. At a basic level then, smart contracts can be regarded 
as self-executing ledger-modification instructions, e.g. “if X occurs, send Y amount 
of tokens from public address A to public address B.”  
  
Being “trustless” 
 
The fascination with the blockchain derives from the fact that it establishes the truth 
of an event without recourse to a trusted third party in an adversarial environment 
where no-one can be trusted. 29 The truth of an event, i.e. the creation and/or transfer 
of tokens, is established by means of “distributed consensus,” i.e. the confirmation 
by a majority of nodes in a decentralized network that a given block has completed 
the proof-of-work. Consequently, the blockchain itself is “trustless” because it 
creates and confirms a certain state of affairs and replaces the need to trust third 
parties with the ability to trust the technology itself. Trustlessness lies at the core of 
all theories that associate blockchains with radical disintermediation. From its 
inception, online commerce has been disadvantaged by the inherently insecure and 
unreliable character of the Internet.30 The latter was not designed as a transactional 
                                                                                                                                                        
financial applications, any environments where trust, security, and permanence are important – for instance, asset-registries, 
voting, governance, and the internet of things – could be massively impacted by the Ethereum platform.” 
http://ethdocs.org/en/latest/introduction/what-is-ethereum.html.  
26 Miners are incentivized to add new blocks by obtaining bitcoins (when their block is added to the blockchain) and transaction 
fees (when they include a particular transaction in their block); it must be noted that proof-of-work-based consensus is only 
indispensable in permissionless ledgers where the parties cannot trust each other, for an overview of different types of consensus 
see: Introduction to Hyperledger Business Blockchain Design Philosophy and Consensus (2016) Hyperledger Architecture, 
Volume 1, 3-4.  
27 : Andreas M. Antonopoulos, Mastering Bitcoin (O’Reilly, Sebastopol 2015) (“Antonopoulos”) 162 
28 Böhme, Rainer, Nicolas Christin, Benjamin Edelman, and Tyler Moore, “Bitcoin: Economics, Technology, and Governance,” 
Journal of Economic Perspectives (2015) 29, 213-238.  
29 The problem is commonly referred to as the “Byzantine Generals Problem;” see: Leslie Lampert et al., The Byzantine Generals 
Problem,(1982) 4 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON PROGRAMMING LANGUAGES AND SYSTEMS at 382. 
30Marjory Blumenthal, David D Clark, ‘Rethinking The Design Of The Internet: The End-To-End Arguments Vs. The Brave 
New World’ (2001) 1 ACM transactions on Internet technology 70, 80. 
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platform and its open nature is particularly unfavorable for transactions between 
strangers who cannot trust each other because they have limited means to verify each 
other’s identities or ensure payment. These shortcomings of the Internet have given 
raise of a host of online intermediaries, such as eBay, paypal or Amazon, which 
provide a secure but closed transacting environment controlled by a single entity. In 
effect, online transactions are heavily mediated due to the need to compensate for the 
technical deficiencies of the internet. In contrast, as the blockchain is inherently 
incorruptible and secure, it is claimed that it has the potential to become a transacting 
platform with no intermediaries. After all, if the platform itself is trustless, there is no 
need for any third parties to absorb or reduce the transactional risks that are present 
on an insecure platform. On a trustless platform, such risks are simply absent.  
 
The above theories are, however, only partially correct.  While it is true that the 
Internet does not constitute a technologically perfect transacting environment, it is 
incorrect to portray blockchains (especially permissionless ones) as such. The more 
so, that once the blockchain is represented as a transacting platform, it is frequently 
implied that everything that connects to, operates on or is embedded in the 
blockchain becomes trustless, incorruptible and secure. Hence, “putting a smart 
contract on the blockchain” eliminates the need for the parties to trust each other or 
to rely on intermediaries. The very nature of the blockchain ensures that the smart 
contract cannot be altered and, as that neither party can influence its execution, its 
performance is guaranteed. It is generally overlooked, however, that the attributes of 
the blockchain (especially trustlessness) are not inherited by the computational 
processes or events that occur outside of its cryptographically secure domain. The 
fact that “something” connects to the blockchain or writes data into a block does not 
mean this “something” is or becomes trustless.  
 
The fascination with decentralized consensus (or with decentralization in general) 
detracts attention from the fact that the original blockchain is “only” a database of 
transactions - not a transaction platform or a transacting environment. Databases, 
with limited exceptions, do not perform any computations 31  and have limited 
transactional capabilities. The blockchain is the output of a computationally intensive 
process but does not perform any complex computations itself. Apart from a limited 
number of native scripts, no code executes within the blockchain. In fact, its 
trustlessness derives from the fact that it does not perform complex computations and 
accepts extremely limited external inputs. As a result, the original blockchain cannot 
be regarded as a transaction platform – unless the term transaction is interpreted very 
narrowly, as the movement of tokens between accounts.32 If the blockchain were 
become a platform for more complex types of transactions, it would be necessary to 
extend its functionalities. This, in turn, would necessitate the addition of protocol 
layers or scripts on top of it or – the creation of a new blockchain. 33 Such additions 
may not, however, be the product of distributed consensus and hence be “trustless.” 
Depending on the type of blockchain and the type of smart contract, smart contracts 
                                                      
31 It is debateable whether stored procedures constitute computations or not. 
32 At present, there are only five types of standard transactions, based on the limited number of scripts that can be processed by a 
bitcoin reference client. Most transactions are Pay-to-Public-Key-Hash, Pay-to-public-key and multi-signature (Limited to 15 
keys), Pay-to-script-Hash and OP-Return; see: Antonopoulos 128, 129, 137.  
33 Antonopoulos 218; Such layered design embodies the principle of “separation of concerns,” which dictates that the individual 
functions of a program (e.g. presentation, business logic, data) be independent from each other to ensure their optimized 
performance, see: Ch. Reade (1989) Elements of Functional Programming. Boston, MA, USA: Addison-Wesley Longman; smart 
contracts based on the original bitcoin blockchain combine the business logic with the data layers, such separation is more 
prominent in the second generation blockchain, Ethereum, see: Buterin (n 7) 19. 
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may operate “in” or “on” the blockchain. The may be embedded within its code or 
execute outside of it. The important point is that once more functionality is required, 
the original benefits of the blockchain may be lost.  
 
Validating transactions 
 
Additional misunderstandings concern the concept of “validation.” Technically, a 
transaction is recorded in the blockchain after it has been validated by the mining 
process. This, however, only means that the majority of nodes established that a 
given node completed the proof-of work, that the transaction input exceeded the 
transaction output and that that the conditions of the locking scripts have been 
fulfilled.34  In many contexts, however, the “validation of transactions” is taken to 
imply that (a) the blockchain can validate smart contracts (a concept generally 
broader than transactions) and that (b) such validation is legally indispensable or at 
least highly desirable. In common law systems, however, contracts need not be 
validated and the concept of “contract validation” does not exist. Whether a contract 
has been formed and whether it correctly reflects the parties’ agreement are questions 
of proof that are determined during the process of adjudication. The blockchain 
provides evidence that a transaction occurred: that one or more tokens were 
transferred from one account to another because the technical conditions of the 
transfer have been fulfilled. It cannot, however, establish its validity in the legal 
sense. Neither can it establish the validity of the contract the transaction forms part 
of. The legal validity of a payment or of a contractual relationship always concerns 
events in the real-world, which cannot be “seen” by the blockchain or validated by 
the mining process. Transactions do not exist in a vacuum and there is always a 
reason for a transaction. It can be reasonably assumed that every transfer of tokens 
occurs as a result of some prior agreement, e.g. as payment for goods, or event. The 
transaction may be recorded in the blockchain but the contract underlying such 
transfer may be legally invalid because, for example, one of the parties lacked legal 
capacity, acted under duress or the agreement was tainted by illegality. Alternatively, 
the transaction might have constituted an upfront payment but the counter-
performance may have failed or proved inadequate. The mining process cannot 
determine whether payment was actually due or in any way attest to the reason for 
the payment. It cannot validate contractual capacity, confirm the absence of vitiating 
factors or, as explained below, establish events that occur outside of the blockchain – 
including contractual performance. As in the case of bank transfers, the bank’s 
records constitute proof of their occurrence but do not reveal why money was 
transferred or prove that a sum was in fact due. “Putting a smart contract onto the 
blockchain” provides a record of its existence but a record need not always reflect 
reality – even if the record itself is trustworthy. In sum, the fact that the blockchain 
“validates” a transaction in a technical sense says nothing about the validity of 
transaction in the legal sense or about the validity of the smart contract the 
transaction forms part of. 
 
“Self-enforcement”  
 
Another prominent concept, “self-enforcement,” refers to the automated performance 
of contractual obligations in the context of blockchain-based smart contracts. Smart 
                                                      
34 Antonopoulos 175, 191 
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contracts are “self-enforcing” because they automatically transfer tokens upon the 
occurrence of pre-defined events or automatically block access to cars or flats, in the 
event of non-payment of a loan or rent.35 The underlying theory is that humans are 
biased and generally unreliable. In contrast, code is unbiased and objective. It cannot 
“change its mind,” refuse to perform or deny payment. Consequently, putting the 
smart contract “on” the blockchain ensures that the contractual obligations are 
executed without deviations because neither party can influence or interfere with its 
operation. Legal and commercial certainty are achieved by the fact that performance 
is technically guaranteed. Technical writings associate self-enforcement not only 
with the automation of transactions and the elimination of human discretion on the 
side of the contracting parties but also, more broadly, with the elimination of the 
need to seek judicial assistance. The reasoning is that the blockchain shields the 
smart contract from the vagaries of human discretion and protects the parties from 
breach. If, then, the likelihood of breach is non-existent (at least theoretically) and 
performance is guaranteed, traditional enforcement mechanisms are no longer 
required. The use of the term “enforcement” is, however, somewhat misleading. 
Contracts are, by definition, enforceable agreements. 36  In a legal context, 
enforcement is associated with the state-sanctioned protection of the parties’ 
economic interest in the performance of the contract. In a colloquial context, it can 
be said that when parties enforce their rights they seek to obtain what was promised 
to them, be it by recourse to third parties or by self-help. In a legal context, 
“enforceability” is thus difficult to disassociate from jurisdiction-specific systems of 
adjudication. Courts generally enforce contracts by awarding damages for loss 
resulting from non- or defective performance, seeking to place the aggrieved party in 
the same position she would have been in had the contract been performed. Courts 
can also enforce contracts by legally ordering performance, predominantly in the 
case of actions in debt, where one party claims the payment of a specified sum that 
has become due. Other types of contractual performance are rarely the subject of 
such orders. Smart contracts, however, equate enforceability with guaranteed 
performance, effectively collapsing these two concepts. Questions of loss or 
damages do not even arise, neither does the question whether a particular sum has in 
fact become due (the simplistic assumption being that it has). This total reliance on 
technology emphasizes the symbolic independence of smart contracts from the legal 
system and raises interesting doctrinal questions concerning the very admissibility of 
such independence, especially in the consumer context. These questions must, 
however, be relegated to a separate paper. 
 
An associated concept is that of “tamper-proof” enforcement, which means that the 
smart contract cannot be stopped or modified. 37  A tamper-proof smart contract 
continues to operate irrespective of external events until its pre-set expiration date. 
Tamper-proof self-enforcement concerns not only performance but also other 
contractual decisions, e.g. whether to terminate the contract in the event of breach or 
whether to enforce collateral in the event of non-payment. Although the idea of 
technically-guaranteed perfect performance is appealing, smart contracts that are 
                                                      
35 Kwesi D. Atta-Krah, ‘Preventing A Boom from Turning Bust: Regulators Should Turn Their Attention to Starter Interrupt 
Devices Before the Subprime Auto Lending Bubble Bursts’ (2016) 101 Iowa Law Review 1187. 
36 For an overview of definitions, each of which encompasses the concept of enforceability, see E. Peel, Chitty on Contracts, 31 st 
edn (2012) vol 1, para 1-016; see also: The American Law Institute’s Restatement of Contracts, 2nd edn, para.1; Brian Coote, The 
Essence of Contract [14-15] 
37 Christopher D. Clack, et al., ‘Smart Contract Templates: foundations, design landscape and research directions’ (2016) ArXiv 
e-prints 4. 
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both “self-enforcing” and “tamper-proof” create a cascade of problems.  
 
First, if contractual performance is relegated to code, it becomes paramount to 
ensure that such code contains no errors. It must be remembered that in many 
contexts, smart contract are not synonymous with simple blockchain transactions but 
may involve code running on top of a blockchain. In such instance, the code of the 
smart contract would be neither incorruptible nor secure. If, however, self-
enforcement is to guarantee performance and if neither subsequent human 
intervention nor a modification of the smart contract are possible then, logically, its 
code must be perfect. It is, however, practically impossible to ensure an absence of 
coding errors (“bugs”) because, statistically, each computer program contains such. 
Perfect performance, implicit in the concept of self-enforcement, may thus be 
impossible to guarantee. Tamper-proof self-enforcing smart contracts may “shield” 
the transaction from the vagaries of human discretion but they introduce the risk of 
performance being affected by coding errors. 38  An interesting result follows: as 
neither party can interfere with the operation of the smart contract, breach is 
technically impossible – at least if breach is associated with an event that is somehow 
related to or within the control of the parties. The smart contract may, however, 
execute incorrectly due to a coding error.  In such instance, it seems more 
appropriate to speak of a malfunction than of breach. Given the practical difficulty of 
preventing such malfunctions, it may be necessary to allocate the risk of their 
occurrence by prior agreement. Multiple risk allocation scenarios are possible, 
depending whether the coding error can be attributed to one of the contracting parties 
or to a third party. In sum, as the possibility of computer errors affecting the manner 
the smart contract operates, cannot be eliminated, it is impossible to claim that self-
enforcement guarantees perfect performance.  
 
Second, it is necessary to ensure that that the smart contract self-enforces as intended 
or as promised, i.e. that the code correctly reflects the parties’ agreement, that 
implementation matches intention. There may, however, be discrepancies between 
the original agreement and its implementation, as reflected in the code of smart 
contract. If the parties used a smart contract created by a third party, there may also 
be a discrepancy between what the parties were told the smart contract would do and 
what it actually does. Whoever writes the smart contract may fail to correctly reflect 
the parties’ original intent, be it due to a misunderstanding of the underlying 
agreement or specification (see below) or as a result of his incompetence or even 
malice. Whoever makes the smart contract available for use may incorrectly 
represent its functionality. If the parties are not programmers themselves, they cannot 
verify whether the code accurately reflects their intentions or whether it will do what 
it was promised to do. The point is not that the parties may not be able to determine 
the actual functionality of the smart contract (as they can hire a specialist to do so) 
but that it may be difficult to establish what takes precedence in the event the code of 
the smart contract does not match the agreement it purportedly embodies. The 
problem is particularly acute given the increasing security concerns surrounding 
smart contracts. 39  Again, the accompanyin problems must be relegated to future 
research. 
                                                      
38  Scholarship increasingly recognizes the dangers of automating legal decisions, including dangers of over-reliance on 
computers, see: Kenneth A. Bamberger, Technologies of Compliance: Risk and Regulation in a Digital Age (2010) 88 Texas 
Law Rev 669. 
39 See Serpent Compiler Audit, ver. 1.0.0 by Zeppelin Solutions (24 July, 2017), which revealed a multitude of security problems 
relating to one of the smart contract programming languages in Ethereum, Serpent. 
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Third, a tamper-proof smart contract requires that all possible events that may occur 
during its lifetime and affect its operation be anticipated. If a smart contract is to 
operate over a period of time, no decisions about its performance can be left to 
humans and every aspect of its operation must be encoded upfront. The benefits of 
self-enforcement would, after all, be lost if it was possible or necessary to revise its 
code to accommodate future events. It is, however, practically impossible to create 
an exhaustive list of events that could affect the operation of a smart contract. A 
tamper-proof self-enforcing smart contract would continue to operate irrespective of 
any change in circumstances, which could lead to a situation where it became 
commercially absurd or even illegal. On a broader level, technical writings fail to 
appreciate that contractual relationships are usually flexible and dynamic -  even in 
those instances when they are based on fixed legal language recorded in formal 
documents. In traditional contracts, it is common to amend certain provisions to 
adapt to external circumstances, such changes in the regulatory or commercial 
landscape. It is also common to tolerate certain deviations from the agreed 
performance without formally amending the contract. It could thus be argued that 
smart contracts are rigid and can become easily disconnected from the transactional 
reality in which they operate because no such adjustments are technically possible. 
Moreover, in traditional contracts, both parties retain the ability to decide whether to 
fulfill their obligations and whether to exercise their rights. 40  Such decisions are 
often made long after the contract has been formed as there may be a significant 
time-lag between the creation and the performance of the contract. If, however, 
deviations from performance are technically impossible and if all rights are exercised 
automatically, the parties lose the ability to adjust to changed circumstances.41 To 
elaborate: in traditional contracts, each party can decide not to perform her 
obligations. Deliberate non-performance may be frowned upon but is not illegal or 
prohibited. Quite the opposite. Legal and economic theory expressly recognize the 
concept of efficient breach: a party is allowed to breach a contract and pay damages, 
if doing so is more economically efficient than performance. 42  Choosing not to 
deliver the goods because another buyer is willing to pay a higher price optimizes 
resource allocation and is legally permissible – as long as the contract breaker 
compensates the aggrieved party for her loss. Being deprived of the option not to 
perform is thus less commercially attractive and legally “dangerous” than commonly 
assumed. Self-enforcement may also have drawbacks for the aggrieved party. In the 
event of breach, the latter can decide whether (and how) to exercise her rights. In 
principle, she has the right to claim damages for the resulting loss (if any) and, on 
occasion, the right to terminate the contract. Whether this right is exercised 
constitutes a fact-specific commercial decision. If, however, the entire contractual 
relationship is locked into immutable code, termination occurs automatically and the 
aggrieved party is deprived of the option not to exercise her rights.43 It can also be 
assumed that in practice contractual performance is rarely perfect and that some 
breaches are deliberately ignored, be it due to their commercial insignificance or to 
preserve an otherwise beneficial relationship. In tamper-proof self-enforcing 
transactions, these possibilities disappear: imperfect performance leads to 
                                                      
40 Swanson 28 
41 Swanson 29 
42 Charles Goetz, Robert Scott, ‘Liquidated Damages, Penalties, and the Just Compensation Principle: A Theory of Efficient 
Breach’ (1977) 77 Columbia Law Review 554; Melvin A. Eisenberg, ‘Actual and Virtual Specific Performance, the Theory of 
Efficient Breach, and the Indifference Principle in Contract Law’ (2005) 93 California Law Review 975. 
43 ISDA & Linklaters, Whitepaper: Smart Contracts and Distributed Ledger – A Legal Perspective (August 2017) (“ISDA”) 
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termination or other predetermined result. In sum: self-enforcement deprives 
contractual relationships of their adaptability and preclude the parties from adjusting 
their legal and commercial positions in response to changed circumstances.44  
 
4. Broader problems of enforceability 
 
Technical writings (and some legal scholarship) occasionally claim that blockchains 
create a parallel transactional universe, or even their own jurisdiction, where the 
parties can transact outside of the legal system. As a result, blockchain-based smart 
contracts would, as indicated, obviate the need for legal rules and institutions. These 
theories may derive from a misapprehension of the practical implications of the 
decentralized character of the blockchain, especially with regards to its consensus 
mechanism of validating transactions. Decentralization has, after all, often been 
associated with the abandonment of traditional legal institutions. Similar claims 
proliferated in early cyberspace scholarship, which proclaimed the independence of 
cyberspace from the legal system and advocated radical disintermediation, which 
seemed to be a natural consequence of the distributed nature of the Internet.45 With 
the benefit of hindsight, it can be observed that the decentralization of Internet 
infrastructure in the technical sense is unrelated to and need no result in the 
decentralization of commerce or a detachment from traditional institutions. It can be 
cynically observed that once the Internet evolved into a platform for commerce and 
once parties started using it to exchange real-world goods and services for real-world 
money, the spirit of cyber-independence subsided considerably. The Internet 
economy has evolved into a capitalist economy.46 After a brief period of theoretical 
turmoil, it has become uncontroversial that contracts formed “in cyberspace” must be 
treated like all other contracts and are subject to the same legal principles. Each 
online transaction is governed by the laws of its real-world jurisdiction. Unless the 
contractual subject matter is illegal, as was the case with most transactions on 
Silkroad, it is also not immediately apparent why anyone would want to transact 
outside of the legal system. 47 Once an exchange involves anything of value, the 
transacting parties must retain the ability to ask the courts for assistance in the event 
something goes wrong. Technical writings, which imply that smart contracts and 
blockchains obviate the need for judicial protection, overlook the simple fact that the 
lack of recourse to established legal institutions would not only incentivize fraudsters 
and hackers, but also discourage the very use of blockchains and smart contracts in 
financial transactions. For smart contracts to become a viable commercial tool, they 
must be not only technically but also legally enforceable. After all, the trustless and 
incorruptible character of the blockchain is of limited significance if the code of the 
smart contract executes outside of the blockchain and if self-enforcement is 
incapable of protecting the parties from the risk of computer errors or from the 
possibility of changed circumstances. It becomes apparent that the parties to a smart 
contract must retain the ability to rely on traditional legal protections. Such 
protections are, however, only reserved to those relationships that carry the indicia of 
a contract.48   
                                                      
44 It is also increasingly recognized that perfect enforcement may not be desirable, see: Lisa A. Shay et al., Confronting 
Automated Law Enforcement, in: Ryan Calo, Michael Froomkin, Ian Kerr eds., Robot Law (Edward Elgar 2016) 258; for an 
explanation of the dangers of perfect enforcement see: Christina M. Mulligan, ‘Perfect Enforcement of the Law: When to Limit 
and When to Use Technology’ (2008) 14 Richmond Journal of Law & Technology 13. 
45 David R Johnson and David Post, ‘Law and Borders – The Raise of Law in Cyberspace’ (1996) 48 Stanford Law Review 1367 
46 Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society (Wiley & Sons, 2nd ed, 2010) 160. 
47 For example, blockchain-based assassination contracts. 
48 Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu, Who Controls the Internet? Illusions of a borderless world (Oxford University Press, 2006) 138.   
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 The prerequisites of enforceability 
 
The prerequisites of a legally enforceable contract can be reduced to two elements: 
intention and consideration. The presence of intention is always evaluated objectively, 
on the basis of the parties’ words and actions. It is commonplace to establish intention 
by means of the offer and acceptance model, which often facilitates the determination 
of the precise time and place a contract is formed. What is more pertinent to the 
present discussion is the fact that intention can be expressed in any manner as contract 
law is inherently form free.49 The existence of a contract is rarely tied to any formal 
requirements, such as writing, signatures or being “certified by notaries.” A contract 
can be formed orally or by conduct,50 it can be expressed in words (either spoken or 
written), Morse code or in computer instructions, including self-executing code. With 
very few exceptions introduced by statute, contract law detracts from form and 
focuses on substance. If the parties want to express their agreement in code or to 
relegate the performance of their obligations to a set of automated processes running 
on a blockchain – there are no legal obstacles preventing them from doing so. The 
second prerequisite of enforceability, consideration, is often described as something 
promised or given in exchange. In practice, some right, interest, profit or benefit must 
accrue to one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or responsibility must be 
given, suffered or undertaken by the other.51 Consideration need not be adequate, it 
only needs to be sufficient in the eyes of the law.52 The focus is on reciprocity, not on 
equivalence of value. The parties can exchange money in return for goods or services, 
or bitcoins in return for digital assets.53 As a result, only those smart contracts that 
involve exchanges can fulfill the requirement of consideration. If no exchange is 
involved, it must be assumed that the term “smart contract” is used in a purely 
technical sense. After all, legal enforceability is hardly required for smart “contracts” 
which are stock tickers or weather apps. At the same time, while there are no 
theoretical obstacles for some smart contracts to be legally enforceable, it is 
impossible to make a general statement that all smart contracts can be legally binding. 
Each case must be evaluated separately to establish whether the parties had the 
requisite intention and whether each party provided something to the other. In 
practice, an exchange of tokens for goods, services or for another type of tokens 
renders superfluous any additional proof of intention and consideration. 54 In most 
instances problems of enforceability do not arise as the smart contract relies on (and 
reflects) an existing legally binding agreement and is only a tool facilitating its 
performance. 
 
The fact that smart contracts automate the performance of contractual obligations is 
legally uncontroversial.55 The debates surrounding automated contracting have been 
largely resolved by the scholarship that evolved around so-called “electronic agents,” 
                                                      
49 Andrew Phang, ed. The Law of Contract in Singapore (Singapore: Academy Publishing, 2012) at p 418: “Unless otherwise 
provided-for, generally by way of statute, the common law does not impose any requirements as to formalities or the manner of 
execution of a contract for such agreement to be legally binding.” 
50 Harvey v Johnston (1848) 6 CB 295; Brogden v Metropolitan Rly Co (1877) 2 App. Cas. 666, HL. 
51 Currie v Misa (1875) LR 10 Ex 153 
52 Chappel & Co. Ltd. v. Nestle Co. Ltd. [1960] A.C. 87 (H.L.). 
53 I bypass the question whether bitcoin is legal tender, sale or barter? 
54 B.A. Hepple, “Intention to Create Legal Relations” (1970) 28 Cambridge L. J. 122 at 127-128; The Aramis [1989] 1 Lloyd's 
Rep 213 at 225 per Lord Bingham; Warren Swain, “Contract as Promise: on the Role of Promising in the Law of Contract. A 
Historical Account.” (2013) 17 Edin. L.R. 1 at 20.  
55 R Nimmer, Electronic Contracting: Legal Issues (1996) 14 J Marshall J Computer & Info L 211; +EDI 
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computer systems that assist and act on behalf of their human operators. 56  The 
possibility of automating transactions or expressing contractual intention by means 
of computer processes has also been expressly recognized in e-commerce 
regulations, such as the United Nation Convention on the Use of Electronic 
Communications in International Contracts 57 or the Uniform Electronic Transactions 
Act.58  To deny the possibility of “delegating” the formation and performance of 
contracts to computers is to deny the legal viability of automated securities trading, 
vending machines and practically all e-commerce websites. 59  In each of these 
examples, the computer executes a prior human decision to engage in a transaction 
within pre-set parameters with whoever complies with these parameters. The 
intention to be legally bound is manifested by means of a computer. In this sense, 
smart contracts represent the intentions of the transacting parties, who chose to 
express their obligations in code and automate certain aspects of contractual 
performance.  
 
Lastly, putting a smart contract “on” the blockchain does not place it outside of the 
legal system or otherwise insulate it from the laws of a given jurisdiction. Apart from 
meeting the prerequisites of enforceability, smart contracts must also remain 
compatible with their jurisdiction-specific legal framework. If a transaction is 
prohibited on grounds of illegality, such as when the parties agree to sell illicit drugs 
or infringe import restrictions, it will not be permitted just because it is “on” the 
blockchain. Similarly, if a smart contract executes an agreement that was formed 
under duress or as a result of an actionable misrepresentation, the smart contract will 
self-enforce but the underlying agreement may be set aside. If a particular type of 
exchange is prohibited or if a contractual provision is illegal or unenforceable under 
the rules of a specific jurisdiction - it remains prohibited, illegal or unenforceable if 
embodied in a smart contract. Blockchains do not create decentralized marketplaces 
operating “free from the reach of regulation.”60 Some blockchain enthusiasts may 
have misinterpreted the statement “code is law” as implying that code can supersede 
the law or that decentralized networks create their own legal regimes. Code may 
guarantee contractual performance or facilitate the transacting process but the 
instructions it executes must remain within the confines of the law.  
 
5. Natural Language and Code 
 
The very viability of smart contracts hinges on the ability to express contractual 
obligations in code. Logically, as natural language cannot be directly executed by a 
computer, self-enforcement requires that the terms of the smart contract be 
computer-readable. There are multiple options: the smart contract can be a 
translation of an existing agreement, it can be created in code from the outset or, 
                                                      
56 T Allen, R Widdison, Can Computers Make Contracts? (1996) 9 Harv J Law & Tech 25; J H Sommer, Against Cyberlaw 
(2000) 15 Berkeley Tech L J 1145.  
57 see: Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracting, Nov. 23, 2005, U.N. Doc. A/60/21, 
Article 12: A contract formed by the interaction of an automated message system and a natural person, or by the interaction of 
automated message systems, shall not be denied validity or enforceability solely on the ground that no natural person reviewed or 
intervened in each of the individual actions carried out by the automated message systems or the resulting contract.  
58 See UETA comment 1 to Section 14, which confirms that contracts can be formed by machines functioning as electronic 
agents for parties to a transaction. It negates any claim that lack of human intent, at the time of contract formation, prevents 
contract formation. When machines are involved, the requisite intention flows from the programing and use of the machine.  
59 interesting issues arise in situations where one or both parties believe that SC are not legally binding and engage in automated 
transactions on this assumption, mistake of law or absence of legal intention? 
60 Aaron Wright, Primavera Filippi, ‘Decentralized Blockchain Technology and the Rise of Lex Cryptographia’ (2015), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2580664, 104. 
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lastly, a contract can be drafted in natural language with subsequent encoding in 
mind. The accompanying challenges concern the conversion of natural language into 
code and, more broadly, the expression of contractual obligations in code (i.e. the 
“encoding” of obligations). Two points must be made before proceeding. First, it 
must be observed that the present discussion would be redundant if technical writings 
confined smart contracts to simple payment obligations occurring within narrowly 
defined relationships, where each party’s performance is reducible to fixed formulae, 
as is the case of options or interest rate swaps. 61  While it is increasingly 
acknowledged that only some contracts can or should be smart, 62 most technical 
writings continue to extoll the ability of smart contracts to transform all types of 
contracts, including employment contracts, leases and mortgages. Second, technical 
writings provide little guidance as to how smart contracts are formed or entered into. 
It is generally assumed that that parties create their own smart contract or agree use 
an existing smart contract created by somebody else. While there are no obstacles to 
the creation of one-off, customized smart contracts, economies of scale dictate that 
smart contracts take the form of generic programs that can be used on a mass-scale. 
They could, for example, embody popular standard form agreements, such as car 
loans, mortgages or interest rate swaps. In such instance, only certain values would 
be customized for individual transactions. Again, different configurations seem 
possible. The important point is that in many circumstances the smart contract is not 
coded by the parties themselves or that at least one of the parties does not participate 
in its creation. Consequently, either both parties or one of them are unable to verify 
whether the code accurately reflects their agreement or to determine how the smart 
contract will operate in practice.  
 
Contract Translation 
 
Given that the coders who create the smart contract cannot (or should not) decide on 
its commercial and legal aspects,63 it is reasonable to assume that there must be an 
document describing the substance of the agreement. Consequently, many smart 
contracts will originate as documents written in natural language that require 
subsequent translation into code. The difficulty of this process is generally 
underestimated. The reasons are twofold.  
 
First, technical writings extol the consistent progress in the areas of machine learning 
and natural language processing and assume that the translation of natural language 
into code can be automated or at least significantly facilitated by technological 
means. At the switch of a button, contracts could be converted into executable code 
in the same manner source code is compiled into object code. Despite consistent 
progress in the said areas, it is presently impossible to automate the conversion of 
natural language into code – at least not without a significant compromise in the 
quality of the output of such conversion. 64 Machine learning enthusiasts might have 
been misled by the relative success of google translate or the sensationalistic reports 
of AI-based systems beating their human opponents at complex games. 
                                                      
61 Kiviat  (n 16) 607. 
62 Karen E.C. Levy, ‘Book-Smart, Not Street-Smart: Blockchain-Based Smart Contracts and The Social Workings of Law’ 
(2017) 3 Engaging Science, Technology, and Society 10, 11; see also: I. Grigg, ‘On the Intersection of Ricardian and Smart 
Contracts’ (2015).  
63 C. K. Frantz and M. Nowostawski, ‘From institutions to code: Towards automated generation of smart contracts’ (2016) iEEE 
1st international workshops on foundations and applications of self-systems (fASW) 210. 
64 Wright and Filippi (n 60) 104; for a non-technical explanation of machine learning see: Harry Surden, ‘Machine Learning and 
Law’ (2014) 89 Washington Law Review 87, 91-95. 
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Approximations seem permissible in automated translations between natural 
languages, where the overall meaning of a sentence can be gleaned from the context. 
They are intolerable, however, when it comes to legal provisions, which are drafted 
with meticulous precision and where one single word may give rise to unintended 
commercial consequences and prolonged disputes.65 Developers fail to appreciate the 
low tolerance for mistakes in legal documents. 66   Moreover, precision seems 
paramount when the smart contract is to self-execute and cannot be stopped or 
amended. If a smart contract is to embody an existing agreement, its translation into 
code will involve a tedious manual process.  
 
Second, developers seem to view contracts as sets of conditional statements, 
abundant in standardized clauses that can be endlessly re-used for different 
transactions. While it is true that lawyers often rely on contractual templates and 
(sometimes too eagerly) copy-and-paste individual provisions, it must not be 
forgotten that the standardization of legal language does not imply that such 
language is capable of a reduction into an algorithm. Despite its formalistic nature, 
legal text is still natural language – and natural language is inherently imprecise as 
the meaning of words always depends on the context. With its lengthy sentences, 
subordinate clauses, nested expressions and references to abstract concepts, legal 
language may be more difficult to translate into code than “normal” natural language. 
It is often suggested that smart contracts necessitate the creation of a custom-built, 
domain-specific programming language that could capture the nuances of legal 
text.67 The main problem, however, is that the translation of natural language into 
code does not constitute a straightforward process of converting legal prose into 
computer-readable instructions but requires the prior interpretation of the legal 
prose. Interpretation is not an academic exercise but serves to establish the exact 
scope of the parties’ obligations, the result to be achieved under the contract or the 
level of effort to be expounded in performing a particular obligation. As indicated, 
the successful performance of a contract may hinge on the meaning of a single word 
and a dispute over a single word can lead to protracted litigation. There is hardly a 
contract that would not require some interpretation and thus the presence of some 
legal and commercial knowledge on the side of the “interpreter.” Contractual 
interpretation is usually performed by courts, after a dispute has arisen.  In the smart 
contract scenario, it would have to be performed before or in parallel with the 
process of translating the legal text into code. Developers, however, can hardly be 
expected to perform this task. The latter requires an in-depth knowledge of the 
principles governing contractual interpretation - principles that are surrounded by 
multiple controversies relating to the question how to determine objective meaning of 
words and expressions, or: the meaning that must be deemed to have been intended 
by both parties. Such meaning can depend on other words used in the given 
contractual document or, more broadly, the context in which they are used. 68  
Whoever interprets the contract must be able to decide between the literal and the 
purposive approach and, in the event of competing interpretations, select the one that 
is more consistent with business common sense.69 The interpreting developer would 
                                                      
65 On the limits of Natural Language Processing see Robert Dale, Classical Approaches to Natural Language Processing, in 
HANDBOOK OF NATURAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING 1 (Nitin Indurkhya & Frederick J. Damerau eds., 2d ed. 2010) 
66  Daniel Martin Katz, ‘Quantitative Legal Prediction—or—How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Start Preparing for the Data-
Driven Future of the Legal Services Industry’ (2013) 62 Emory Law Journal 909, 936. 
67 See e.g. Stephen Wolfram, Computational Law, Symbolic Discourse and the AI Constitution—Stephen Wolfram Blog (2016) 
http://blog.stephenwolfram.com/2016/10/computational-law-symbolic-discourse-and-the-ai-constitution/#comments 
68 Peel, 229 [6-009] 
69 Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank [2011] UKSC 50; Re Sigma Finance Corp [2009] UKSC 2. 
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have to ascertain the meaning that the contract “would convey to a reasonable person 
having all the knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the parties 
in this situation in which the where at the time of the contract.”70  Moreover, it must 
not be forgotten that the process of interpretation is not limited to situations when 
words are ambiguous but may sometimes reveal the very presence of ambiguity.71  It 
may not be immediately apparent that a particular word or expression is capable of 
multiple interpretations. In the context of smart contracts, the problem would not lie 
in the parties disagreeing over the meaning of words but in the possibility of 
incorrect interpretations by those who decide how to convert a particular obligation 
into code. To further aggravate matters, most contracts contain gaps and require that 
terms be implied to make the agreement workable in practice. Again, the implication 
of terms is traditionally performed by courts, not by the contracting parties. 
Logically, had they discovered the gap, they would have addressed it. Given that that 
the implication of terms requires an understanding of the legal rules and the 
commercial context of a particular transaction, coders may not be able to identify and 
to fill contractual gaps themselves. Ultimately, while it could be argued that the 
aforementioned problems of interpreting or supplementing contractual language may 
be solved by lawyers and coders co-operating in the translation of legal documents 
into executable code, it must be acknowledged that despite such co-operation neither 
the parties, nor their lawyers are able to ascertain whether the code of the smart 
contract correctly reflects the originating legal document. Assuming that the smart 
contract should mirror this document in all its nuances, there is potential for 
discrepancies between what was agreed and what was implemented. Such 
discrepancies are particularly unsettling given that once the smart contract 
commences self-enforcement, it cannot be stopped or amended.  
Direct coding 
To avoid the difficulties of translating legal language into code, it is sometimes 
suggested that smart contracts be written in code from the outset. Such “direct 
coding” would not only facilitate the execution of the smart contract by a computer 
but also reduce, or even eliminate, the ambiguity of natural language.72 The contract 
would be smart from its inception. To bypass the stage of drafting in legal prose, 
lawyers would, of course, have to learn how to program. Alternatively, programmers 
would have to learn the basic principles of contract law. Technical writings suggest 
that such direct coding of smart contracts would force lawyers to be more precise and 
structured in describing the rights and obligations of the parties. In this sense, smart 
contracts could in fact reduce ambiguity because must be capable of a single 
interpretation. Given that most lawyers are unlikely to become programmers (just as 
most programmers are unlikely to become skilled drafters), it is suggested that even if 
smart contracts cannot be coded directly, contracts could be drafted with encoding in 
mind. To this end, the contracting parties (and their lawyers) could reorient the 
manner in which they express their agreement to facilitate its subsequent translation 
into code,73 e.g. describe their obligations in a formalized, structured manner and 
provide objective, measurable criteria that must be met for such obligation to be 
considered performed. In this context, some commentators acknowledged that the 
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ability to trust the blockchain is unrelated to the ability to trust the smart contract. As 
the latter must be transparent to stakeholders and correctly reflect the agreement on 
which it is based, it must be created by lawyers and programmers together. 74 This in 
turn requires that those two groups be able to communicate via a common language. 
Smart contracts should thus be written by lawyers in a “controlled legal natural 
language” that is logical, clear, unambiguous, and comprehensible to programmers.75  
Lawyers would be using this language to write de facto specifications guiding the 
actual coding of the smart contract. The above approaches, particularly the latter, 
appear prima facie attractive as they could reduce or even eliminates ambiguity and 
minimize the potential for disputes. They mistakenly assume, however, that (a) the 
elimination of ambiguity from contractual language is not only possible but also 
desirable and that (b) all contractual obligations can be described in a manner that 
enables their expression in code. Each of these assumptions raises a multitude of 
technical and legal problems the detailed description of which exceeds the scope of 
this paper. Some general observations are, however, possible – if only to illustrate the 
complexity of the issues involved.  
 
(a) Eliminating Ambiguity? 
 
Most programmers - or those who propound the idea that smart contracts constitute a 
cure to bad legal drafting -  assume that it is always possible to draft complete and 
unambiguous agreements. For an developer, the failure to do so evinces the limited 
skill or incompetence of the lawyer.  By virtue of their training developers perceive 
ambiguity as inherently bad. It is important to understand, however, that ambiguity 
has both advantages and disadvantages. While it may increase the potential for 
disputes over the exact scope of the parties’ obligations, it also creates flexibility as it 
allows the parties to retain a measure of flexibility in performing their side of the 
bargain and in evaluating each other’s performances. It also enables both parties to 
adapt to changing circumstances without having to redraft the agreement. Developers 
fail to recognize that in contract law, ambiguity is a feature not a bug. Apart from the 
natural ambiguity accompanying all human languages and the ambiguity that results 
from sloppy drafting, many contractual provisions are deliberately written in a broad, 
slightly imprecise manner to ensure a certain degree of leeway. The ambiguity of 
certain provisions may also reflect the stronger bargaining position of one party, who 
drafts the contract in a manner enabling it to deliver the absolute minimum without 
being accused of breach. Terms may also be left vague because of an unwillingness 
to invest resources in extended negotiations or drafting, or due to the widespread 
approach that the contract is only a formality while the “real” agreement is reflected 
in the ongoing commercial relationship.76 Although it is trite law that contracts must 
be “certain and complete” to be considered binding and enforceable, it is not 
necessary for all contractual obligations be described with algorithmic precision. 
Traditional contracts generally work well in the context in which they were made 
without providing for all eventualities or describing all obligations in detail.77 It has 
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been observed that gains in precision may result in rigid determinism that will not 
necessarily breed certainty but destroy adaptability, especially in long-term 
contractual relationships where the potential for a change in circumstances is 
particularly high.78  
 
Assumedly, technical writings regard smart contracts as a technological “cure” to 
commercial and legal uncertainty. It is, however, impossible to create certainty by 
technological means. Moreover, in every contractual relationship or commercial 
transaction some uncertainty is always anticipated and tolerated – be it with regards 
to unforeseen external events (such as force majeure) or with regards to the manner 
obligations are performed. Automation-oriented “precision drafting” may deprive the 
contract of its natural adjustability and isolate it from the surrounding context. As 
observed by two commentators, programming requires actors to “quantify the 
qualitative, discretize the continuous, or formalize the non-formal.”79
 
For a contract 
to be devoid of ambiguity, it would have to anticipate all possible events that might 
affect its operation and describe endless combinations of external variables. After all, 
traditional contracts “operate” in a complex and uncertain environment: the real 
world. Coding smart contracts, for complex, uncertain environments is extremely 
difficult due to the number of things that can go wrong and the inability to predict 
how the evolving commercial context will affect the contractual relationship.80 It 
must also be assumed that an unambiguous contract (assuming that its creation is 
possible) would, inevitably, be extremely long because many obligations would have 
to be described with a large number of eventualities in mind. In comparison to their 
traditional counterparts, contracts written in code – or contracts written with 
subsequent encoding in mind - would increase in volume and complexity. As the 
number of errors increases in proportion to the number of lines of code, longer smart 
contracts would contain more errors and display a higher potential for erroneous self-
enforcement. Some technical writings specifically acknowledge that certain errors 
may arise due to the unique nature of smart contract programming. 81  In sum, 
precision comes at a cost: the contractual relationship becomes rigid and 
deterministic, while the increase in the length of the contract leads to a higher 
likelihood of malfunction.    
 
(b) Encoding obligations 
 
Additional problems concern the assumption made by many technical writings that 
all obligations can be expressed in code.82 To recall, smart contracts were initially 
envisaged in a limited number of contexts, such as financial instruments. As the 
smart contract narrative became more ambitious, other contractual obligations are 
potential “candidates” for self-enforcement. Such claims must, of course, be viewed 
with skepticism. It is reasonable to assume that only those contractual obligations can 
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be expressed in code that can be represented as an algorithm or are otherwise capable 
of an exact, formulaic description. The problem is not one of ambiguity or errors in 
interpretation but concerns the very nature of certain obligations and legal concepts. 
For example, some types of contractual performance rely on abstract concepts such 
as “good faith” or “reasonableness” and may be impossible to represent as a closed 
catalogue of actions or in the form of an objectively measurable result. Developers 
may view every contract as a collection conditional statements and assume that each 
contractual provision can be reduced to an algorithm or a finite result. This 
misunderstanding of contracts (and contract law!) may underpin the grandiose 
theories of smart contracts disrupting the legal landscape. Admittedly, many 
contractual provisions are operational in nature and prescribe sequences of actions 
e.g. “deliver [object] to [place] on [date]” or the achievement of specific results.83 
Many contractual obligations are, however, based on reasonable care, where the 
parties must undertake, or refrain from, certain actions without having to produce a 
measurable outcome. It may be difficult to reduce them to sequences of steps and to 
provide objective benchmarks against which they can be evaluated. Obligations 
based on care are, after all, frequently qualified by concepts such as “reasonableness” 
or “best efforts.” It also seems impossible to catalogue all component obligations 
falling under the concept of “reasonable endeavors” or to describe how to perform an 
obligation in “good faith.” Additional problems would concern contractual 
provisions that are non-operational and concern administrative issues, such as the 
choice of jurisdiction, or co-define the operational provisions by limiting or 
excluding contractual liability in the event of breach. It should thus be conceded that 
not all obligations can be expressed in code and that not all contracts can “be smart.”  
 
6. Integrating with the Real World 
 
A discrete set of technical challenges concerns the event(s) triggering the transfer of 
tokens. For smart contracts to function, parties must not only formulate agreements 
in a manner facilitating their expression in code and define objective criteria to 
determine contractual performance but also provide the smart contract with data that 
enables such determination.84 The ability to encode contractual obligations must be 
distinguished from the ability to automatically determine the fulfillment of such 
obligations. The distinction can be explained as follows: the obligation to deliver a 
box to a certain place by a certain time can be precisely described and expressed in 
code. It is also unproblematic to encode the obligation to pay once the box is 
delivered. The smart contract to pay upon delivery must, inevitably, contain 
references to physical objects (box) and events in the real-world (delivery). If, then, 
payment is conditioned on delivery and if the entire process is to be automated, as 
implicit in the concept of self-enforcement, it must be possible to establish delivery 
without human involvement. To recall: eliminating the latter guarantees objectivity 
and prevents disputes. Moreover, the event triggering payment (i.e. contractual 
performance) must be computationally verifiable. 85 As a result, the self-enforcement 
of the payment obligation is premised on (a) the availability of relevant data 
concerning such performance, (b) the ability to feed such data to the smart contract 
and (c) the performance itself being of a type that can be objectively and 
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automatically established. 86 For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that only the 
payment obligation self-enforces and that the other obligation is not automated, i.e. 
the box is delivered by a human not by a robot.87 At the same time, while the 
delivery itself is not automated - the determination of delivery is.  
 
To establish that the payment condition has been fulfilled, smart contracts must 
communicate with the physical world. The resulting problems are particularly 
noticeable in blockchain-based smart contracts. The original blockchain was 
designed as an insulated environment, which cannot accept input from the “real 
world.”88 In this context, technical writings distinguish between on-chain and off-
chain events. If a particular process, asset or event concerns or occurs in the 
blockchain, it is referred to as “on-chain.” Only on-chain events are natively visible 
to the blockchain. Such events are few: the passage of time, the addition of blocks 
(which includes the generation of tokens and the validation of transactions) and the 
transfer of tokens, which occurs in response to the presentation of private keys (see 
below). All processes, objects or events in the physical world are “off-chain.” The 
blockchain cannot “see” or accept direct input about or from off-chain events.  
 
To understand the limitations of smart contracts, it is necessary to explain how 
transactions are initiated. Transactions rely on public key cryptography, which 
involves the use of a public and a private key. The keys are generated together by a 
complex algorithm, which guarantees that it is impossible to derive the private key 
from the public key. The public key, which resembles a bank account number and 
remains publicly visible, is required to receive tokens. The private key, which 
resembles a PIN or a password, is required to spend them. When tokens are 
transferred to the account represented by the public key, only the person with the 
correct (“corresponding”) private key can access them. No tokens can be moved 
from the public key unless the correct private key is used. In practice, each 
transaction contains a script that states that the token(s) are payable to whoever 
presents the private key corresponding to the account (public key) associated with 
the payee. The assumption is, of course, that only the intended payee can present the 
private key.89 On a technical level, scripts “lock” tokens to a specific public address 
and to unlock (i.e. spend) them it is necessary to provide the private key.90 Scripts 
may require the presentation of one or multiple private keys.91 Although technical 
writings state that locking scripts can include “complex conditions,” which must be 
satisfied by the unlocking script to release payment,92 it must be emphasized that 
those “complex conditions” only refer to various configurations of private keys, as 
prescribed by the locking script. They cannot, for example, make direct references to 
any off-chain events.  In sum, the unlocking scripts can only respond to on-chain 
events, which involve the presentation of one or more private keys. Smart contracts 
can thus be compared to hermetically sealed boxes, which can only be opened with 
one or more keys but are otherwise insulated from the outside world. As a result, if a 
smart contract conditions payment on the occurrence of an off-chain event, it is 
necessary to involve a third party that will sign the unlocking script after verifying 
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that the off-chain event has taken place. Entities that furnish the technical 
infrastructure to communicate information about off-chain events to smart contracts 
are commonly referred to a “oracles.” Oracles do not feed such information into the 
blockchain directly (as this would compromise its trustlessness) but “only” sign the 
script unlocking the tokens with their private key when an off-chain event is 
established as true. Needless to say, this approach leaves no room for a nuanced 
evaluation of contractual performance, as the oracle can only sign or not sign the 
script. Despite its apparent simplicity, this model is plagued by a cascade of technical 
interdependencies.  
 
First, it is necessary to find a trustworthy and reliable oracle. Oracles exist outside of 
the blockchain and are neither trustless nor decentralized. Despite the naming 
convention, they do not constitute infallible sources of truth and cannot guarantee 
that an off-chain event actually occurred. Moreover, oracles do not create or compute 
the required information about off-chain events themselves but obtain if from 
external data sources, such as websites, commercial providers (e.g. Bloomberg), 
prediction markets (e.g. Augur), answer engines (e.g. WolframAlpha) or other 
blockchains. Apart from finding a trustworthy oracle it is equally important to find a 
trustworthy source of information.93 As a result, the parties to a smart contract (or its 
creators) must select an oracle and a data source to be used thereby. To prevent 
disputes, they must also agree beforehand that they will accept the information 
provided by their chosen oracle (and its data source) as true. Smart contract 
evangelists rarely mention the practical inability of ensuring that both the oracle and 
its data source are as trustless as the blockchain.94 As both oracles and data sources 
can be compromised, 95 it may be necessary to create a network of oracles, which 
obtain the information from multiple independent data sources. In such instance, the 
off-chain event triggering payment must be confirmed by multiple oracles, i.e. the 
payment will be released once N-of-M oracles sign the unlocking script.96 In effect, 
the benefits of the trustless and incorruptible nature of the blockchain are easily lost 
once the smart contract requires information about off-chain events.  
 
The second set of challenges concerns the very act of obtaining information about 
off-chain events. The latter can be divided into those that are public and universally 
visible, such as stock prices or weather conditions, and those that do not possess 
those attributes. Most types of contractual performance, including the 
aforementioned delivery of a box, fall into the latter category. Some off-chain events 
generate public data that can be obtained from multiple authoritative sources. For 
example, it is easily established that at a particular time the NASDAQ reached a 
particular value. This value will be identical even if reported by multiple sources, e.g. 
Bloomberg and Reuters. Difficulties arise when different sources provide divergent 
information about the same event, e.g. the temperature at a particular location is 
reported differently depending on the placement and sensitivity of sensors. In such 
instance, it may be necessary for the parties to agree on one specific source to avoid 
later disputes. The real complications start, however, when information about an off-
chain event is not publicly available or otherwise difficult to obtain. Returning to the 
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box example, its delivery may be publicly visible and verifiable, but information 
about this event may be difficult to obtain – at least not in an automated fashion or 
from a single, unbiased authoritative source. If, then, there are no readily available 
sources of information about certain events, the parties must create such sources 
themselves. This may require the establishment of an elaborate physical 
infrastructure, such as equipping the gates of warehouses with sensors and 
embedding all boxes or containers with QR codes, NFC tags etc. Alternatively, the 
parties must rely on third party providers who already have such infrastructure in 
place. In either instance, it becomes apparent that smart contracts conditioning 
payment on off-chain events, require an environment filled with sensors, physical 
objects embedded with tracking technologies and computers that continually monitor 
their surroundings.97 It is often argued that many off-chain events will become easier 
to determine automatically with advances in the Internet-of-Things, which involves 
the proliferation of Internet-connected sensors providing real-time information about 
the state of different physical objects. Unfortunately, such claims underestimate the 
relative infancy of Internet-of-things technologies, particularly with regards to their 
insecurity and absence of standardization. As in the case of oracles and their data 
sources, the original benefits of putting the smart contract on the blockchain are lost 
as neither the infrastructure creating the data source nor its provider can be 
guaranteed to be trustless or secure.   
 
Lastly, it must be acknowledged that self-enforcement may be limited to transactions 
where off-chain events are computationally verifiable. Just like not all contractual 
obligations can be represented in code, not all off-chain events can be captured as 
computer-readable data or measured with objective criteria. Many types of 
contractual performance may require human involvement. For example, while the 
delivery of a box constitutes an objectively ascertainable event, establishing whether 
its contents conform with the contractual description may involve both quantitative 
and qualitative elements the evaluation of which may necessitate human inspection.  
It may, be difficult to automatically and correctly determine that the box contains 
grade “A” Granny Smith apples or genuine Louis Vuitton bags. While establishing 
the quality of apples is, at least in theory, achievable by means of sophisticated 
image recognition technologies, the authenticity of a Louis Vuitton bag requires a 
manual inspection by a trained human specialist. 98  Self-enforcement is also 
impossible in transactions that require flexibility in assessing performance or when 
contractual performance must be evaluated holistically.99 These technical limitations 
confirm the very narrow range of contractual obligations that are candidates for self-
enforcement.   
 
7. Concluding Observations  
 
Any serious debate of smart contracts must be based on a solid understanding of 
what is legally and technologically possible. Quite surprisingly, there are relatively 
few (if any) legal obstacles to the use of smart contracts in commercial transactions. 
The main challenges to their use seem to be technical more than legal. On a broader 
level, one can question the very benefits of putting smart contracts onto blockchains. 
While the original bitcoin blockchain is trustless and secure, it is also extremely 
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limited in its processing capabilities and permits only very simple transactions. 
Effectively, smart contracts become synonymous with the automated execution of 
simple payment instructions. More complex transactions require more advanced 
blockchains or protocols running on top of them. Such blockchains or protocols may 
not, however, be decentralized, secure or trustless. In effect, smart contracts must 
simply be seen as programs operating in distributed computing environments and not 
as a semi-mythical technology liberating the contracting parties from the shackles of 
traditional legal and financial institutions. As a result, the revolutionary claims 
concerning disintermediation and self-enforcement made in the context of the 
original blockchain can no longer be made. Moreover, once smart contracts involve 
the performance of obligations in the real world, their operation involves multiple 
dependencies on external, centralized and (possibly) insecure entities. As smart 
contracts can only be as trustless as the oracle and the data source that provide them 
with information about off-chain events, the fact that the blockchain itself is trustless 
and secure, becomes largely irrelevant. In other words, once smart contracts involve 
more complex transactions, i.e. exchanges that go beyond the movement of tokens in 
response to the presentation of one or more private keys, the benefits of putting them 
on the blockchain seem easily lost. 
 
Another set of problems, unrelated to blockchains per se, concerns the subject matter 
of smart contracts. Apart from the theoretical question whether full automation (i.e. 
self-enforcement) of certain obligations is advisable, it must be acknowledged that 
from a practical perspective, only some contractual obligations can be expressed in 
code and only some obligations can be regarded as computationally ascertainable. 
Consequently, smart contracts may be suitable for a rather narrow range of 
transactions. They are difficult to envisage for contracts involving obligations relying 
on such concepts as “reasonableness,” “best efforts” or for obligations the fulfillment 
of which requires an overall evaluation of contractual performance. Given their 
inability to fully reflect and allow for the complexities of the real world, the practical 
use of smart contract may thus be limited. At the same time, on a theoretical level, 
the provide fertile ground for research in the area of computational law and force 
practitioners to be more aware of ongoing developments in programming languages. 
In light of the frequent suggestions concerning the development of a language that 
could serve as a common ground for lawyers and developers or even permit the 
direct coding of contractual obligations, it is also necessary to inquire about the 
desirability of reducing (or even eliminating) ambiguity in contracts and to 
investigate the trade-offs between precision and certainty on one hand and ambiguity 
and flexibility on the other. The reduction of ambiguity, praised by technical writings 
as one of the main benefits of smart contracts, may be less attractive than originally 
assumed. Self-enforcing smart contracts are rigid, deterministic and insulated from 
their commercial context. The elimination of human judgment and the automation of 
choice can easily evolve into a situation where the contracting parties effectively lose 
the ability to choose whether and how to exercise their rights. Furthermore, it must 
not be forgotten that smart contracts can ensure perfect performance and lower 
transaction costs resulting from the elimination of intermediaries and traditional 
enforcement mechanisms only on the assumption that their code is perfect: it 
correctly reflects the parties’ commercial agreement, it contains no coding errors and 
no security loopholes. Needless to say, such assumption cannot be made. 
Interestingly, the technical shortcomings of smart contracts seem to increase the need 
for prior agreement and/or complex regimes allocating liability for coding errors 
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and/or irregularities in the functioning of oracles and data sources. Smart contracts 
may eliminate human bias and the risk of non-performance, but they introduce the 
risks of programming errors, security breaches and discrepancies between original 
intent and actual implementation. Given that the aforesaid events may give raise to 
complex disputes, it is unlikely that smart contracts will reduce the need for lawyers 
and courts or otherwise diminish the significance of the legal profession. For the time 
being, the opposite may be expected. 
 
 
 
 
 
